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Abstract 
The current study tested: the interaction between self-enhancing behavior following negative 
feedback and individual differences variables; the effects of self-enhancement on emotion 
regulation; and how this defensive response can be decreased using a writing-based intervention 
called self-affirmation.  To test these ideas, we randomly assigned people to self-affirmation or 
control conditions, giving them all negative feedback on an IQ test, and then measuring their 
level of self-enhancing behavior.  We measured mood at three points of time in the study: at the 
beginning, after the negative feedback, and after their opportunity to self-enhance.  In our study, 
we discovered that although people with high WMC bias less and those with low WMC bias 
more as their negative affect increases, this interaction is eliminated by the act of self-
affirmation.  In other words, self-affirmation counteracts the ego threat caused by the feedback.  
Furthermore, when those with high WMC do choose to bias, they experience greater success at 
emotion regulation as a result of their increased cognitive capacity. 
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Regardless of one’s profession or lifestyle, no one can avoid negative feedback.  This 
feedback could be in the form of useful criticism or insensitive scorn and could strike when we 
are working or socializing.  Regardless of the format, it is imperative that people understand how 
to appropriately respond to this feedback, inhibiting typical defense mechanisms like self-
enhancing behavior (Schmeichel & Demaree, 2010), self-justifying attitude change, self-serving 
attributions for success and failure, out-group derogation (Fein & Spencer, 1997), and zealous 
conviction about one’s beliefs (McGregor et al., 2003; Steele & Liu, 1983).   
This study seeks to understand the individual differences in cognitive and personality 
variables that lead to an increase in self-enhancing behavior following negative feedback, as well 
as to explore the effectiveness of an intervention called self-affirmation at reducing this behavior 
so that people can become more open to threatening, but important, information.  There are two 
major hypotheses concerning self-affirmation that we will address in this study: 1.) Self-
enhancement hypothesis: Those with higher cognitive abilities should bias more as a byproduct 
of successful emotion regulation, but this effect should be reduced by self-affirmation, 2.) 
Emotion regulation hypothesis: People with high working memory capacity (WMC) should 
experience a smaller decrease in negative affect following the negative feedback due to their 
innate ability to successfully regulate emotions, but this gap between low and high WMC should 
decrease in the self-affirmation condition because they are now both using the same method of 
emotion regulation.  
Self-Enhancing Behavior 
Past research suggests that when confronted with negative feedback, the desire to view 
oneself positively often leads people to increase self-enhancing behavior (Koole, 2009).  Self-
enhancing behavior counteracts a threatening event by increasing how favorably one views 
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themselves and their abilities, despite the reality of the situation (Baumeister, Heatherton, & 
Tice, 1993).  This form of bias, also referred to as a positive illusion, is the sort of thought 
process that leads a person in support of capital punishment to favor it more after hearing 
countering viewpoints (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009).  Others have said that self-enhancement 
works by defining the constructs at an abstract level (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009).  According to 
this theory, a student who failed a test would declare that this single test does not accurately 
measure intelligence because it concerns too narrow of a topic.  When defining constructs in this 
abstract way, it is rare to encounter feedback that can break through this defense because the 
definition can subtly change whenever necessary.  These adjustments of one’s views are often so 
minor—allocating undue weight to positive outcomes that do not measure intelligence or too 
little weight to highly diagnostic tests—they easily pass by unnoticed. 
Although self-enhancing can protect the ego when used in moderation, there are many 
repercussions to excessive self-enhancement, like greater rates of depression and dropping out of 
college (for a review, see Lo et al., 2011).  One aspect of self-enhancing behavior that has been 
studied with fervor over the past decade is the biased processing of health information. After 
reviewing the literature on the subject, Harris and Napper (2005) reported that those who were 
most affected by the health risk were also the least persuaded to change their lifestyles. A recent 
study by Armitage,	  Harris,	  and	  Arden	  (2011)	  demonstrated	  that	  when	  regular	  alcohol	  drinkers	  were	  presented	  with	  information	  on	  the	  dangers	  of	  alcohol,	  they	  derogated	  the	  message	  as	  a	  means	  of	  minimizing	  anxiety	  and	  maintaining	  their	  self-­‐esteem	  (Schmeichel	  &	  Vohs,	  2009).	  	  If	  they	  were	  to	  accept	  the	  threatening	  health	  message,	  their	  self-­‐esteem	  would	  otherwise	  be	  degraded	  because	  they	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  they	  were	  behaving	  in	  ways	  that	  were	  inconsistent	  with	  their	  goals	  of	  being	  smart	  individuals,	  as	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evidenced	  by	  their	  ill-­‐informed	  healthcare.	  	  Thus,	  not	  only	  can	  self-­‐enhancement	  affect	  one’s	  psychological	  state,	  it	  can	  impact	  one’s	  physiological	  health.	   
While the tendency to self-enhance clearly has disadvantages outside of the laboratory, it 
also can bias questionnaires administered by researchers.  For this reason, researchers developed 
many types of scales over the years to sequester this construct so that they can account for the 
amount of bias that the participant may display throughout the course of an experiment (for a 
review, see Paulhus et al., 2003).  But most measures do not consider that the participant may 
indeed be telling the truth when they claim to never curse, which is a question that is often used 
in social desirability scales.  To verify just one question would take an in-depth observational 
study of their behavior and thus researchers just assume that each person curses at least a little, 
regressing to the mean.   
That is why it is important to establish a credible criterion, as is the practice in criterion 
discrepancy measures, wherein researchers can know with certainty if the participant is telling 
the truth (Funder & Colvin, 1997).  The easiest and most economical way to do so involves 
creating a test with unambiguous, concrete answers, as is the practice in the Over-Claiming 
Questionnaire (OCQ; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003). The OCQ measures a variable 
called “over-claiming,” which is a key feature of those who self-enhance. See the Methods 
section for an in-depth explanation of the OCQ’s procedures. 
Self-Affirmation 
One possible way to reduce self-enhancing behavior is through an intervention called 
self-affirmation.  Self-affirmation can come in many forms, from positive feedback to writing 
exercises concerning one’s positive characteristics or important values (see overview in Sherman 
& Cohen, 2006).  Regardless of the method, self-affirmation has been shown to decrease out-
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group derogation (Fein & Spencer, 1997), increase the implementation of health behavior 
intentions and changes (Harris & Napper, 2005), and lessen the effect of stereotype threat 
(Miyake et al., 2010). This is only scratching the surface. Every year, additional studies are 
published focusing on new areas in which defensive behaviors can be substantially reduced by 
self-affirmation exercises. 
This intervention is based on self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), which states that the 
overall goal of the individual is to maintain the image of the self as someone who is “morally 
adequate...competent, good, coherent, unitary, stable, capable of free choice, capable of 
controlling important outcomes, and so on” (p.  262).  This theory predicts that, when threatened, 
people will employ defense mechanisms so as to reach the goals quoted above.  But it goes a step 
further to describe how defensive behavior can be lessened and self-concept restored by 
affirming an important, but unrelated, source of self-esteem (i.e., attribute) or self-clarity (i.e., 
value; Klein & Harris, 2009), as is the practice in the self-affirmation intervention.   
Self-affirmation has been theorized to work through many mechanisms, like increasing 
positive affect, positive interpersonal feelings, or ratings of self-concept (Armitage & Rowe, 
2011).  Koole et al. (2010) proposed that affirmation could work by disengaging people from 
their current frustrated goals and instead allow them to focus on their extended values, elevating 
these values as their primary source of self-esteem. Related to this theory, Schmeichel and Vohs 
(2009) proposed that self-affirmation promotes high levels of mental construal—or, in other 
words, causes the participant to favor abstract descriptions of events.  
Interestingly, increasing one’s level of mental construal and thus viewing the issue in a 
more abstract way is a similar mechanism by which self-enhancement was proposed to work 
(Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). Yet the difference between these two methods of attaining high 
CUSHIONING	  THE	  IMPACT	  OF	  NEGATIVE	  FEEDBACK	   	   7	  
levels of mental construal is that self-affirmation accomplishes it by boosting self-control, the 
ability to inhibit automatic thoughts, emotions or behaviors, often in order to obtain a greater 
reward over time (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). By reminding people of their abstract goals, 
people can accept the pain of the present moment in order to work towards a more promising 
future. This theory makes the most sense out of all the explanations because self-control has been 
shown to decrease when a person feels threatened (i.e., ego depletion), so by increasing self-
control via affirmation, this threat can thereby be offset. Although they may work through 
similar methods, self-enhancement is a more involved process that requires self-deception and 
additional cognitive resources to maintain this deception, whereas self-affirmation eliminates the 
systematic distancing of oneself from negative events in favor of balanced information 
processing (Alicke & Sedikides, 2011). 
Within the contexts of this study, self-affirmation will take the form of a writing exercise 
prompting the participants to write about why their most esteemed values are important to them 
(For review of affirmation exercises, see McQueen & Klein, 2006).  By recalling these values 
and times when they have played an important role in their lives, participants will bolster their 
self-esteem against the negative feedback they all will receive on an intelligence test.  This 
negative feedback was necessary to both induce self-enhancing behavior and to trigger the 
effects of self-affirmation, which has only been shown to benefit people who currently feel 
threatened (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2011).  
Working Memory Capacity (WMC) and Emotion Regulation 
A study by Schmeichel and Demaree (2010) displayed a link between the amount of self-
enhancing behavior and the size of working memory capacity (WMC) reserves.  Daneman and 
Carpenter (1980) theorized that WMC is the mechanism that allows for the simultaneous storage 
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and manipulation of information (for a review of recent theories, see Baddeley, 2006).  Since 
then, psychologists have developed many measures of WMC and most of these tasks involve a 
memory span task (i.e., reporting the last word in each sentence) that is embedded within a 
processing task (i.e., reading, performing mental rotation, solving equations, etc.).  In Daneman 
and Carpenter’s original study, they found a correlation between WMC and reading 
comprehension.  Since then, this result has been expanded upon to include correlations with 
intelligence, processing speed, and reasoning on previous knowledge (Baddeley, 2006).   
A series of studies by Schmeichel, Volokhov, and Demaree (2008) demonstrated that 
WMC is closely related to emotion regulation, which concerns one’s ability to inhibit an 
emotional response.  In their study, individuals with higher WMC more capably suppressed 
emotional responses while viewing emotionally charged stimuli.  The researchers theorized that 
those with high WMC were more successful at emotion suppression because they had the 
additional cognitive resources to allocate to the process of emotion regulation.  The methods by 
which one can exercise emotion regulation include: (a) selection of the situation, (b) 
modification of the situation, (c) deployment of attention, (d) change of cognitions, and (e) 
modulation of responses (Gross, 1998).   
Schmeichel and Demaree’s Past Research 
We based our current study closely around the methods and premise of past work by 
Schmeichel and Demaree (2010).  They hypothesized that people with high WMC are more 
skilled at emotion regulation and that they use self-enhancement towards this aim.  To test this, 
they broke their methods up into two days.  The first session begun with a popular measure of 
mood, the Positive and Negative Affectivity Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988), and concluded with a measure of WMC, the operation span task (OSPAN; Turner & 
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Engle, 1989).  On the second day, they introduced their independent variable, which was whether 
they received negative or no feedback after taking a fabricated test of emotional intelligence, 
termed the “MacMillian Lifestyles Test.”  This test included 20 multiple-choice questions about 
their socio-emotional preferences like, “Which of these characteristics do you find most 
important in a friendship? A) Understanding; B) Loyalty; C) Similarity; D) Compassion.”  In the 
feedback condition, some of the output given by the computer included:  
Your responses indicate that you lack some of the emotional abilities that contribute to 
psychological well-being…your responses indicate a tendency to overestimate your own 
importance… you are likely to experience distress (perhaps even depression) when you 
encounter failure or other hardships that are inevitable in life.  (p.  740) 
Those who did not receive feedback simply notified the experimenter of their completion.  After 
this test, they took the Over-Claiming Questionnaire, followed by an additional PANAS.  Their 
results, displayed in Figure 1a, demonstrated that although people with low WMC bias more in 
the no feedback condition, those with higher WMC engaged in more self-enhancement by 
claiming greater familiarity with fictitious items on the OCQ when presented with negative 
feedback.  Figure 1b illustrates that whether people with high WMC received negative feedback 
or no feedback whatsoever, they did not experience a decrease in mood from the first PANAS to 
the second PANAS administered after the OCQ. Meanwhile, those with low WMC experienced 
an increase in negative affect as a result of the negative feedback.  They reported that these 
findings demonstrate that people with high WMC are better able to regulate their emotions 
because they have more cognitive resources to allocate to successful self-enhancement. 
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Figure 1.  Schmeichel and Demaree's (2010) results: 1a) People with high WMC bias more when 
confronted with negative feedback and, 1b) negative feedback does not affect those with high WMC due 
to their ability to regulate their emotions. 
 
Conversely, past research has shown that self-enhancement increases when participants 
are distracted (Paulhus, Graf, & Selst, 1989) or depleted (Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 
2005)—or, in other words, when cognitive resources are limited.  Furthermore, impulsive 
individuals have been found to over-claim more on difficult trivia questions, most likely because 
they have lower self-control and lower WMC on average (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003).  These 
results suggest that high WMC individuals should be less susceptible to overcompensating after 
an ego threat because they are better able to regulate their emotions automatically, without 
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utilizing the crude process of self-enhancement (Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008).  
Within our replication, we hope to uncover which of these interpretations is best supported by 
the data—do people with high WMC bias more because they can or do they bias less because 
they can more successfully use alternative methods of emotion regulation? 
Opposing Theories: Self-Affirmation v. Self-Consistency Theory 
There are two theories that predict the ways in which people respond to negative 
feedback.  The first is the one supported by the results of Schmeichel and Demaree (2010), the 
self-affirmation theory.  As discussed earlier, this is the idea that people strive to sustain a 
positive view of themselves as moral and appropriate individuals (Sherman & Cohen, 2002).  
Within this viewpoint, when threatened, people wish to increase their self-concept by any means 
possible in order to return to their baseline self-esteem level.  In accordance with this view, 
everyone should wish to self-enhance but those with higher WMC should be able to do so more 
and exhibit fewer negative emotions afterwards, because of their greater cognitive ability to 
regulate emotions. 
However, the self-consistency theory (Aronson, 1999) argues that dissonance (i.e., self-
enhancement) occurs while trying to achieve the goal of consistency and coherence.  In this 
theory, people develop a schema of their own behaviors and abilities early on in their lives so 
that they can acquire a sense of predictability and control.  Once this self-concept has stabilized, 
they seek out information to confirm this self-schema—distorting reality by ignoring that which 
disconfirms their self-concept and paying particular attention to that which confirms it.  It is for 
this reason that self-enhancing behavior has also come to be called verification biases, because 
they are most frequently employed when attempting to achieve this consistency and coherence 
(Oreg & Bayazit, 2009).  Thus, because people with high WMC typically excel in school, they 
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will identify more strongly with being intelligent.  Therefore, people with high WMC will self-
enhance more than people with low WMC because the negative feedback contrasts more starkly 
with their self-concepts.    
But it is important to keep in mind that this result will only occur in high WMC 
individuals who care about their intelligence to an average degree. Those who do not care, will 
not experience inconsistency, while those who value it as one of their most important priorities 
are more likely to change their behavior in order to become more consistent with the new 
information (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2011).  This study seeks to distinguish between these 
opposing theories so as to determine if people bias more due to the self-consistency or self-
affirmation theory. 
Current Study 
Because one our study’s purposes was to replicate Schmeichel and Demaree’s study, we 
modeled our procedures from their design.  The main differences between the two studies are 
that we also included an affirmation exercise, we gave intelligence (rather than emotional) 
negative feedback to all of our subjects (rather than to just half of them), and we included an 
additional PANAS immediately following the negative feedback so as to more accurately 
pinpoint the OCQ’s moderating effect on mood.   
In this current study, we will investigate the effects of self-affirming important personal 
values on decreasing self-enhancing behavior, as well as the effects of individual cognitive and 
personality differences in moderating the amount of self-enhancing behavior following negative 
feedback.  To do so, we first measure baseline mood and WMC. Then the participant either 
writes about their personal values (i.e., self-affirmation condition) or their morning routine (i.e., 
control condition). Next they receive negative feedback. As mentioned earlier, we must give 
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negative feedback both in order to invoke the defensive response (i.e., self-enhancement) and in 
order to allow our participants to benefit from self-affirmation, since this intervention has been 
shown to be useless under non-threatening conditions—it only decreases defensive behavior, it 
does not increase openness above baseline levels (Schmeichel &Vohs, 2009). Based upon this 
research, we designed our study so that we threaten a value we presume to be important to all 
university-level students.  This negative feedback will be given in the form of a poor score on an 
intelligence test (i.e., Raven Progressive Matrices; Raven, 1962).  After the intelligence test, 
participants take another PANAS, following by the Over-Claiming Questionnaire, which will 
operationalize their self-enhancing behavior by comparing their proportion of hits to the number 
of false alarms, capped off by a final PANAS (Paulhus et al., 2003).   
Over-inflating one’s view of the self makes one vulnerable to being viewed poorly by 
others and introduces irrationality to one’s understanding of the world.  Following Schmeichel 
and Demaree’s past study, we developed two primary hypotheses.  The self-enhancement 
hypothesis predicts that those with high WMC will bias more and, as a result, experience less 
negative emotions in response to the negative feedback. But, importantly, bias rates should 
decrease for everyone following self-affirmation because they will rely on this as their primary 
method of emotion regulation.  The emotion regulation hypothesis predicts that those with high 
WMC will be less emotionally affected by the negative feedback overall, but that the difference 
between low and high WMC with high emotional reactivity will be smaller in the self-
affirmation condition since they both will be using the same method of emotion regulation, 
rather than each person using the method that comes most easily and naturally to them.  The 
implied, secondary part of this hypothesis is that people with high WMC generally use a 
different mode of emotion regulation than those with low WMC.  Furthermore, this study will 
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investigate the relationship between WMC and self-enhancement, shining light onto the 
moderating variables of this defensive behavior, as well as the other individual differences that 
facilitate self-enhancing behaviors. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 61 undergraduate students (36 females and 25 males) at the University 
of Colorado at Boulder.  With the exception of being enrolled in this psychology course, there 
was no inclusion or exclusion criterion.  One additional subject took part in the study but the data 
could not be used due to an equipment malfunction during the Raven task, which prevented the 
display of the negative feedback. 
Research Design 
The study was a three-factor between-subjects design, which included the categorical 
self-affirmation condition (self-affirmation versus control), and two continuous individual 
difference variables, WMC and emotional reactivity.  We randomly assigned participants to 
either the affirmation or morning routine conditions by subject number before the study began.  
There were 30 participants in affirmation condition (males=10, females=20) and 31 in morning 
routine condition (males=8, females=23).   
Negative Feedback 
Twenty-four of the most difficult Advanced Raven Progressive Matrices were chosen for 
the participant to complete (Raven, 1962).  This test presented the participant with a matrix of 3 
x 3 patterns, with the block in the bottom right hand corner missing, as displayed in Figure 2.  
They had to choose the correct answer from a series of eight choices. To emotionally involve the 
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participant with their performance, we created the pretense that this test was highly correlated 
with future success by reading the following script to each participant: 
Attempt to solve as many test items as possible in five minutes.  After five minutes, the 
test will end and you will receive your score.  This score will be calculated by comparing 
your accuracy and speed to a sample of 10,000 undergraduate students throughout the 
nation who took this test as a part of a longitudinal study.   
This study spanned 10 years and tracked the progress of freshmen through college, and 
into the professional world.  As demonstrated by this longitudinal study, this intelligence 
test is a good predictor of future success.   
	  
Figure 2. Example from the Raven Progressive Matrices. 
We discouraged them from guessing by claiming that wrong answers would hurt their score.  
They were only allotted five times to attempt all twenty-four problems because, in our pilot 
study, no one could complete more than 15 puzzles in that time period. We wanted to place them 
under the stress so that they were rushed and thus more likely to believe the negative feedback. 
After the end of the five minutes, the computer took several seconds to “process the data” and 
they were all given the same negative feedback, informing them that they had scored at the 27th 
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percentile, translating this into laymen’s terms as, “This means that, out of a nationwide sample 
of 10,000 undergraduate students, 73% scored better than you.” 
Measures 
Self-Affirmation.  The only manipulated variable within this study was the type of 
writing activity that participants performed.  Participants in the self-affirmation condition chose 
two or three values from a list (e.g., relationships with friends or family, independence, spiritual 
values, etc.) that were most important to them.  They were prompted to think about times when 
those values were or would be important to them.  At the end of this essay, they wrote the top 
two reasons why these values were important to them and answered three questions on scale of 
six-point Likert-scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree (e.g., “In general, I try to live up 
to these values”).   
Participants in the morning routine (i.e., control) condition were given the same amount 
of time to write about their morning routine.  After this essay, they answered the same number of 
questions, although the nature of these differed from the affirmation task.  For example, they 
described the top two most time-consuming activities in their morning routine and ranked 
questions on a six-point Likert-scale like, “In general, I eat breakfast every morning.”  People in 
both conditions were told that this writing exercise should take them 12 to 15 minutes to 
complete, so as to allow them enough time to answer in full detail. 
Self-Enhancement.  The Over-Claiming Questionnaire (OCQ) is a criterion discrepancy 
measure, which calculates self-enhancement by having the participants rank their familiarity on a 
scale of 0 (never heard of it) to 6 (very familiar) for 150 items across ten categories like, 
“Physical Sciences” and “Fine Arts” (Paulhus et al., 2003).  If the questionnaire only included 
real items, it would not be possible to tell if one possessed all of the knowledge to which one 
CUSHIONING	  THE	  IMPACT	  OF	  NEGATIVE	  FEEDBACK	   	   17	  
claimed. To account for this problem, 30 out of the 150 items (three within each of the ten 
categories) are fictitious.  This scale has been demonstrated to be an effective predictor of both 
cognitive ability, α = .73, and self-enhancement, α = .72 (Paulhus, 2003).  
This scale calculates two primary measurements, bias and accuracy. Bias measures how 
familiar one must be with an item before one claims knowledge of it. It has been shown to 
correlate with the Narcissistic Personality Inventory, β = .35, p < .01, and Self-Deceptive 
Enhancement Scale, β = .30, p < .01. Accuracy is one’s ability to correctly claim knowledge of 
real items while simultaneously not claiming knowledge of non-existent items.  Although it may 
sound similar to bias, Paulhus et al. reported a low correlation, r = .21.  Paulhus et al. clarified 
that they could more intuitively be considered knowledge (i.e., accuracy) and confidence (i.e., 
bias).  To illustrate, an individual can be both biased and accurate if they have thorough 
knowledge of one category yet still claim to recognize foils.  Because the items included on the 
test are mostly academic in nature, accuracy has been shown to positively correlate with IQ, β = 
.52, p <  .01, and to a lesser degree, so does bias, β = .17, p < .05. 
To calculate bias and accuracy, we used signal detection analysis (Swets, 1964).  This 
method groups potential responses into hits (claiming knowledge of existent items), correct 
rejections (not claiming knowledge of non-existent items), misses (not claiming knowledge of 
existence items), and false alarms (claiming knowledge of non-existent items).  The signal 
detection analysis method makes use of both hits and false alarms because of the idea that if 
people over-claim on fake items, they will most likely over-claim on real items as well.  We used 
the simple equation for bias and accuracy outlined by Paulhus et al. and utilized in Schmeichel 
and Demaree’s study.  In order to give more weight to higher scores, this method first calculates 
the proportion of hits and misses at all possible levels of claiming knowledge on the scale of 0 to 
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6.  To begin, the baseline for counting a response as a hit is set at 1, so only a 0 can pass as a 
miss or a correct rejection and anything greater than 1 counts as a hit or a false alarm.  This 
criterion is increased one point at a time until a person must rate the item a 6 in order to make 
either a hit or a false alarm.  Once these proportions of hits (out of a possible 120) and false 
alarms (out of a possible 30) have been calculated, the two scores are calculated with the 
following equations: 
Bias = (Proportion of hits) + (Proportion of false alarms) 
Accuracy = (Proportion of hits) - (Proportion of false alarms)  
Then we averaged all of these individual six scores (from the six different criteria points) in 
order to calculate the total bias and accuracy that we used for all of the analyses.   
Working Memory Capacity.  After the first PANAS, participants completed the Spatial 
Span Task to assess their WMC (Shah & Miyake, 1996).  The Spatial Span Task presented a 
capital letter (e.g., F, R, or P) that was rotated and occasionally mirrored-imaged.  Participants 
identified the orientation of the letter by performing mental rotation and responded either 
“normal” or “mirror” out loud.  After each letter, they saw an arrow pointing in one of the eight 
(cardinal and ordinal) directions.  The twelve trials were broken into three blocks which each 
presented the participant with 2 arrows, 3 arrows, 4 arrows and 5 arrows in a random order.  At 
the end of each trial, they recorded the direction that each arrow was pointing by the order in 
which the arrow appeared.  Their scores were calculated by counting how many arrows they had 
correct (including both proper order and proper placement) out of a total of 42. 
Emotional Reactivity.  The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) is a 
measure of mood that contains 20 adjectives total: 10 negative, 6 positive, and 4 neutral (Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  This questionnaire was administered on three occasions throughout 
CUSHIONING	  THE	  IMPACT	  OF	  NEGATIVE	  FEEDBACK	   	   19	  
the course of the study—at the beginning, after the negative feedback, and after the measure of 
self-enhancement before the participants were debriefed.  The order for each of the three tests 
was randomized prior to the beginning of data collection and the order was permanently set so 
that each participant encountered the words in the same order.  The participant ranked the extent 
to which they felt each adjective at that precise moment in time on a 101-point scale, ranging 
from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).  The purpose of the PANAS within this experiment was to 
determine if the participant was affected by the negative feedback and if this damage was 
ameliorated by their self-enhancing behavior during the Over-Claiming Questionnaire (OCQ).   
To analyze mood, we calculated several indices.  First, we divided each of the mood 
measures into one of three categories: negative, positive or neutral.  Then we took the average 
score from each of these categories for all of the three PANAS administrations.  To understand 
how the experimental manipulations affected mood, we took the difference between each of the 
three administrations.  For example, to calculate the effect of the negative feedback on affect, we 
subtracted the negative mood average in PANAS 1 from that of PANAS 2—higher scores meant 
higher emotional reactivity, while negative scores meant that their negative affect had actually 
decreased from the baseline measurement.  To calculate the effect of self-enhancement on 
emotion regulation, we subtracted PANAS 3 from PANAS 2. In this construct, higher scores 
represented a greater decrease in negative mood as a result of their self-enhancing behavior.  The 
final mood measure asked the question of if negative mood changed over the entire course of the 
study.  This measure subtracted PANAS 3 from PANAS 1 and higher scores implied a greater 
decrease in negative mood from the beginning to the end of the study.  This measure was 
calculated as a means to replicate Schmeichel and Demaree (2010) because they did not have an 
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equivalent to our PANAS 2—they only had a PANAS at the beginning of the study (on the first 
day) and a PANAS after the OCQ (on the second day). 
Procedure 
Before the experiment, participants were all randomly assigned to either the self-
affirmation or the mourning routine (i.e., control) condition.  Upon arrival, participants were 
seated in front of a desk with a Macintosh computer, where they remained for the duration of the 
study.  After giving consent, participants completed a series of questionnaires.  The first set of 
questionnaires contained the PANAS and other measures which were not included in this study.  
Subjects then completed a measure of WMC, the Spatial Span Task.   
At this point, the subjects either performed the self-affirmation or morning routine 
writing exercise based upon the earlier random assignment.  After they completed this task, the 
participant was given five minutes to take a shortened version of the advanced Raven 
Progressive Matrices, after which they all received identical negative feedback. 
To conclude, they completed another set of questionnaires.  This set began with another 
PANAS, then the Over-Claiming Questionnaire, finished off by another PANAS, in order to 
detect any differences in mood that the self-enhancing behavior may have induced.  Upon 
completion, the participant was probed for suspicion, debriefed, and thanked for their 
participation.  This experiment took approximately one hour to complete.   
Results 
Within our study, we had two main hypotheses: 1.) Self-enhancement hypothesis: Bias 
increases as WMC increases but this trend can be counteracted by affirming important values; 2.) 
Emotion regulation hypothesis: People with high WMC are more skilled at regulating their 
emotions following negative feedback, but self-affirmation decrease these WMC group 
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differences.  To test these hypotheses, we have broken our analyses into two main sections, first 
addressing the self-enhancement hypothesis and then addressing the self-regulation hypothesis.   
Baseline Comparison of Groups 
 Before we began the analysis of our data, we verified that the random assignment was 
successful by analyzing the group means for the measurements taken prior to the experimental 
manipulation (i.e., writing condition).  As displayed in Table 1, there were no significant 
differences between the two groups. 
Table 1.  Baseline measurements to ensure successful random assignment. WMC is measured on a 
scale of 0 to 42 and all PANAS scores are measured on a scale of 0 to 100. 
 
Affirmation Morning routine   
  
 
Mean SD Mean SD Min. Max. F p 
WMC 20.3 1.2 22.8 1.2 7.0 36.0 2.1 0.2 
Negative (Baseline) 13.3 2.1 11.3 2.6 0.0 43.4 0.4 0.5 
Positive (Baseline) 45.1 3.7 40.5 0.4 6.0 85.2 0.7 0.4 
Neutral (Baseline) 47.3 3.7 41.1 3.8 0.0 91.3 1.4 0.3 
Analysis of Self-Enhancement Hypothesis 
As explained earlier, the self-enhancement hypothesis predicts that people with high 
WMC will self-enhance more but that bias rates will decrease in the self-affirmation condition. 
To test this hypothesis, we first used bias as our independent variable. To verify that self-
enhancement did not affect accuracy rates, as it did not in Schmeichel and Demaree (2010), we 
included that as our dependent variable in our second analysis. 
Analysis of Bias.  For our main analysis of self-enhancement, we conducted a three-
factor between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) to assess the impact of two continuous 
individual difference variables—emotional reactivity and WMC—and one categorical 
independent variable—writing exercise condition (i.e., affirmation/morning routine—on our 
dependent variable, OCQ bias scores.  In this analysis, our measure of emotional reactivity was 
the difference between the first (baseline) and second (after negative feedback) negative PANAS 
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scores, which we calculated to account for differences in baseline negative affect, as well as to 
account for the dependence inherent in measurements from the same participants.  Larger 
emotional reactivity scores indicate a greater increase in negative mood from the 1st to the 2nd 
PANAS, presumably as a result of the negative feedback. 
Main effects.  Both the main effect of affirmation condition (MAffirmation = .73, 
MMorningRoutine= .71), F(1,53) = .09, r = .08, p = .77, and emotional reactivity (MAffirmation = .72, 
MMorningRoutine = .72), F(1,53)= .05, r = -.04, p = .83, were not significant.  Although the main 
effect of WMC was significant, F(1,53)= 4.76, r = -.33, p = .04, the trend was not in the 
expected direction. Instead, as WMC increased, bias decreased (MAffirmation = .64, MMorningRoutine = 
.81).   
Two-way interactions.  The two-way interaction between WMC and condition, F(1,53) = 
.01, p= .92, and the two-way interaction between condition and emotional reactivity, F(1,53) = 
.23, p = .63, both failed to approach significance.  But the two-way interaction between 
emotional reactivity and WMC, shows that as WMC increases, the effect of emotional reactivity 
on bias decreases, F(1,53) = 5.05, p = .03.  In other words, while people with low WMC bias 
more than people with high WMC on average, this gap is larger for those with high emotional 
reactivity than it is for those with low emotional reactivity.  Although on its own emotional 
reactivity has little effect on self-enhancing behavior, people with different levels of cognitive 
ability appear to have different ways of coping with their negative emotions. This two-way 
interaction, depicted in Figure 3, uses the Aiken and West (1991) method of graphical display 
and divides the data into ±1 standard deviations, so as to represent continuous variables in a clear 
way. 
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Figure 3.  Two-way interaction between WMC and emotional reactivity. Even if people with high WMC are 
largely bothered by the negative feedback, their bias rates do not increase.  Meanwhile, more negative 
mood leads to more bias for those with low WMC. 
 
Three-way interaction.  The main effects and the two-way interaction between WMC, emotional 
reactivity and affirmation condition were qualified by the effects of a significant three-way 
interaction, F(1,53) = 3.31, p = .04.  As depicted in Figure 4, while people in the morning routine 
condition still either increase (i.e., low WMC) or decrease (i.e., high WMC) as emotional 
reactivity increases (4a), bias levels for people who have affirmed remain constant regardless of 
emotional reactivity (4b).  To plainly state it, self-affirmation eliminates the effect of emotional 
reactivity.  This interaction demonstrates that although there was no main effect of self-
affirmation, the intervention counteracts the influence of strong emotional responses.  In other 
words, while only some people were severely threatened by the content of the negative feedback, 
self-affirmation eliminated the amount of additional bias triggered by this defensive behavior, 
thus equating them will people who did not experience the threat to the same extent.  Further 
interpretation of this interaction will be provided in the Discussion section.   
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Figure 4.  These graphs depict the three-way interaction between WMC, emotional reactivity, and 
condition.  Although people with high WMC tend to decrease their bias as negative affect increases and 
those with low WMC tend to increase their bias as negative affect increases, the effects of the affirmation 
condition counteracts this trend for both low and high WMC. 
 
Analysis of Accuracy.  Next we analyzed OCQ accuracy (i.e., ability to discriminate between 
real and fake items) because we wanted to verify that it was unaffected by self-enhancing 
behavior, as reported by Schmeichel and Demaree (2010). Although this measure may sound 
similar to bias, they were uncorrelated, r = -.10.  We used the same three-factor between-subjects 
ANOVA structure as before, except that we replaced bias with accuracy as the dependent 
variable.   
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Main effects.  The main effect of WMC was in the predicted direction, indicating that as 
WMC increases, accuracy increases, F(1,53) = 2.73, r = .24, p = .10, although this effect did not 
obtain significance.  The main effect of condition also was not significant, F(1,53) = 2.73, r = -
.12, p = .10.  The only other marginally significant predictor within the model was emotional 
reactivity, F(1,53) = 3.84, r = .22, p = .06, which demonstrated that as negative affect increased 
in response to the negative feedback, accuracy also increased.   
None of the two or three-way interactions of accuracy approached significance.  This 
analysis demonstrated that the effects of self-affirmation are specific to bias rates. 
Analysis of Emotion Regulation Hypothesis 
The purpose of both self-enhancing behavior and self-affirmation is emotion regulation.  
To assess the effect of WMC and bias rates on subsequent mood ratings, we first analyzed the 
group means for the negative mood scores in all three PANAS administrations (see Table 2) with 
a mixed design two-factor ANOVA with one between-subjects factor (i.e., affirmation versus 
morning routine) and one within-subjects factor (three time points of negative mood 
measurement).  Although people in the affirmation condition had consistently higher negative 
affect than those in the morning routine condition, the main effect of condition was not 
significant, F(1,59) = .78, p = .38. 
Table 2.  Mood by condition descriptive statistics 
 
Affirmation Morning Routine 
  
 
Mean SD Mean SD F p 
PANAS 1 13.34 2.11 11.33 2.15 0.44 0.51 
PANAS 2 17.77 2.29 14.97 2.33 0.73 0.4 
PANAS 3 12.11 1.87 10.07 1.91 0.58 0.45 
The main effect of mood was significant, F(2,58) = 9.15, p < .001, indicating that there 
were differences between the three separate measurements of mood.  In analyzing this trend of 
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mood, we discovered that it is quadratic in nature, increasing following the negative feedback 
and decreasing after the OCQ, F(1,59) = 15.95, p < .0001. 
Because we were interested in if people with high versus low WMC individuals achieved 
different levels of emotion regulation success, we included WMC as a moderator in our analysis.  
Even though the trends went in the expected directions, as indicated by Figure 5, the results were 
not significant.  Within this graph, people with high WMC experienced less negative affect on 
average, F(1,57) = 3.43, p = .07, but the two way interaction between condition and WMC did 
not approach significance, F(1,57) = 2.01, p = .16.   
	  	  
Figure 5.  Quadratic effect of mood. This graph also includes condition (where MR=morning routine and 
SA=self-affirmation) and depicts the non-significant WMC x condition interaction. 
Schmeichel and Demaree reported that those with high WMC had lower negative affect 
following self-enhancement due to their success at emotion regulation via increased bias rates.  
To evaluate this claim, we will first replicate their analysis using the difference between the 1st 
PANAS and the 3rd PANAS as our dependent variable.  This variable will show us the 
participants’ total decrease (or increase) in negative mood from the beginning to the end of the 
study.  The second analysis will focus on the difference between the 2nd PANAS and the 3rd 
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PANAS, so as to directly view the effects of bias rates on emotion regulation, as operationalized 
by emotional reactivity. 
PANAS 3 – PANAS 1 analysis.  Within their study, Schmeichel and Demaree did not 
measure mood directly following the negative feedback (i.e., PANAS 2 in our study), so we will 
replicate their analysis by comparing the 1st PANAS to the 3rd PANAS, as they did.  Schmeichel 
and Demaree’s primary hypothesis pertained to the two-way interaction in this model between 
bias and WMC, which predicts that the more people with high WMC bias, the less negative 
emotion they will experience at the end of the experiment.  Because of our interest in self-
affirmation, we also wanted to see how condition moderated this two-way interaction between 
bias and WMC.  We conducted a 3-factor between-subjects ANOVA with the between-subjects 
two-level independent variable of condition, and two continuous individual difference variables, 
WMC and bias, where the dependent variable was the change in negative affect from the 
beginning to the end of the study (i.e., PANAS 3 negative affect minus PANAS 1). 
Main effects.  None of the main effects or two-way interactions approached significance.  
There was no trend of WMC, F(1,53) = .008, p = .93, condition was still far from significance, 
F(1,53) = .54, p = .47, and although the main effect of bias was the largest, it was still not 
significant, F(1,53) = 1.60, p = .21.   
Two-way interactions.  None of the two-way interactions were significant.  This is 
important because the original study directly related to the two-way interaction between bias and 
WMC, F(1,53) = 1.69, p = .20.  Although this interaction did present a trend that was similar to 
that which they reported in their 2010 study, it was not significant.   
Three-way interaction.  This three-way interaction showed significant differences 
between mood across levels WMC and the conditions, F(1,53) = 4.41, p = .04.  Graph 6a depicts 
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that in the morning routine condition, there was no significant difference between either high or 
low WMC participants who biased one standard deviation below average, but that as bias rates 
increased, negative affect decreased for those with high WMC and increased with those with low 
WMC.  These results partially replicate those found by Schmeichel and Demaree (2010) because 
those with high WMC were able to use self-enhancement in order to successfully regulate their 
emotions, whereas those with low WMC who self-enhanced experienced an increase in negative 
affect.  But when self-affirming, higher bias rates led to an increase in negative affect for both 
groups. Graph 6b depicts this trend and highlights that while self-affirmation was associated with 
more negative mood when coupled with high rates of bias for both groups, this trend was 
especially true for those with high WMC.   
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Figure 6.  Emotion regulation three-way interaction. In charts a and b, a higher score indicates more 
negative mood in the 3rd PANAS (at the end of the study) than in the 1st PANAS (baseline mood).  
Negative scores indicate that negative mood has decreased throughout the course of the study.  6a) In 
the morning routine condition, as bias increased, the positive relationship with WMC increased, leading to 
a greater reduction in negative affect for those with high WMC. 6b) After affirming important values, the 
interaction was no longer significant, leading both groups (high and low WMC) to be the same regardless 
of the extent to which they biased. 
It is worthwhile to emphasize that the gap in change in negative affect is much smaller 
between the low and high WMC within the self-affirmation condition than it is within the 
morning routine condition. To analyze these gaps, we developed two 2-factor ANOVAs with 
two continuous individual difference variables, WMC and bias, where the dependent variable 
was the change in negative affect from the beginning to the end of the study. The first ANOVA 
only examined data from the morning routine condition it reported a significant WMC by bias 
interaction, F(1, 27) = 9.40, p = .005, which validated our prediction that there is a significant 
difference between those with low and high WMC and high levels of bias.  The second ANOVA 
only examined data from the self-affirmation condition and it verified that the gap between these 
two groups was no longer significant, F(1,27) = .22, p = .64. 
 PANAS 2 – PANAS 3 analysis.  We made use of our additional PANAS measurement 
taken after the negative feedback and directly preceding the OCQ, so as to determine if over-
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claiming moderated the effect of a decrease in negative mood, or if the affirmation prior to the 
negative feedback (or automatic emotion regulation for the morning routine condition) was more 
responsible.  By subtracting the negative affect values of the 3rd PANAS from those of the 2nd 
PANAS, we computed a dependent variable that specifically examined the effect of the OCQ on 
mood.  A higher value indicated a greater decrease in negative affect as a result of over-claiming.  
The ANOVA design for this analysis was the same as for the PANAS 3 – PANAS 1 analysis, 
except that the dependent variable was now the difference between PANAS 2 and 3. 
Main effects.  As was the case in the last analysis, there were no main effects of WMC, 
F(1,53) = .08, p =.78, rates of bias, F(1,53) = 1.93, p =.17, or condition, F(1,53) = .0004, p =.98. 
Two-way interactions.  There were no significant two-way interactions.  In fact, the 
interaction between WMC and bias—Schmeichel and Demaree’s interaction of interest—was 
less significant than in the last analysis, F(1,53) = .004, p =.95.   
Three-way interaction.  The three-way interaction also was no longer significant, 
F(1,53) = 1.49, p =.23.  This decrease in significance indicates that the effects of mood 
regulation do not appear to be linked to the bias ratings on the Over-Claiming Questionnaire—
they instead occurred immediately (i.e., prior to the 2nd PANAS), without the use of self-
enhancement.  This suggests that the results found in Schmeichel and Demaree may also have 
differed if they had measured mood at this point in the study, rather than assuming that bias is 
the only factor that moderates mood.   
Discussion 
To recapitulate, the primary hypotheses of this study were: 1.) When within the morning 
routine condition, the higher the WMC, the greater the over-claiming. But self-affirmation 
should reduce self-enhancing behavior because it gives the participant an easier method by 
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which to regulate emotions, 2.) Emotion regulation following negative feedback is moderated by 
WMC. Those with higher WMC experience less negative affect overall but this gap is lessened 
when in the self-affirmation condition because low and high WMC individuals were more likely 
to use the same emotion regulation method. We will address each one of these hypotheses, their 
results and implications in turn. 
Self-Enhancement 
The hypothesis that self-affirmation decreases the amount of self-enhancing behavior was 
partially supported.  It was only partially supported because, as a result of the main three-way 
interaction between the writing exercise conditions, WMC, and emotional reactivity, only some 
groups of participants experienced this decrease.  Without self-affirmation, participants biased 
more (i.e., low WMC) or less (i.e., high WMC) as emotional reactivity increased.  Self-
affirmation eliminated the effect of emotional reactivity, which meant that while those with low 
WMC exhibited a decrease in bias, those with high WMC actually exhibited a slight increase in 
bias compared to their emotionally reactive counterparts in the morning routine condition.   
While our hypothesis (as it was worded) was only partially supported, we can see that 
although the amount of self-enhancing behavior may have increased for some people as a result 
of self-affirmation, the total amount of defensive behavior still decreased overall.  How is this 
possible?  This is because before we assumed that all people over-claim when they are 
threatened.  But the self-consistency model posits that if people value an attribute highly and it is 
threatened, they may actually change their views of themselves to fit with the new information, 
or be more likely to act in the direction of the negative feedback.  That could be the trend that we 
observed in our data with high WMC biasing less after the negative feedback when in the 
morning routine condition, because they accepted the information as true and sought to be more 
CUSHIONING	  THE	  IMPACT	  OF	  NEGATIVE	  FEEDBACK	   	   32	  
accurate in the future.  Self-affirmation thus affected this group by boosting self-esteem and 
eliminating the need for this sort of self-degrading behavior. 
Whereas the self-consistency theory allows people to feel humbled in the case of failure, 
the self-affirmation theory assumes that people will need to find a way to bolster their self-
esteem to counteract every threat.  This is exactly the sort of impact we observed upon people 
with low WMC who did not self-affirm.  As their negative affect increased, they biased more as 
a means of creating a more positive image of themselves.  When in the affirmation condition, it 
was not necessary to bias to the same extent because they already held a positive view of 
themselves, despite the negative feedback. 
As you can see, both theories (i.e., self-consistency and self-affirmation) play a clear role 
in the interpretation of our three-way interaction.  While self-affirmation theory explains the self-
enhancing tendencies of those with low WMC in the morning routine condition and high WMC 
in the affirmation condition, the self-consistency theory explains the degrading tendencies of 
those with high WMC and high emotional reactivity in the morning routine condition.  Most 
importantly, affirming important values makes it less necessary to follow either method, because 
they have already been buffered against the threat with a less complicated cognitive process. 
Emotion Regulation 
Our study was largely based off of Schmeichel and Demaree’s two primary hypotheses: 
1.) People with high WMC will experience a smaller increase in emotional reactivity over all, 2.) 
The difference between low and high WMC with high emotional reactivity will be smaller in the 
self-affirmation condition.  Our results did not fully support either of these claims.  Before we 
begin with the emotion regulation hypothesis, the main effect of WMC in our primary analysis of 
bias demonstrated that people with high WMC biased less on average, which did not support the 
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finding upon which they based their results—that people with high WMC biased the most.  Our 
finding instead supports the alternative hypothesis proposed earlier in this paper, that self-
enhancement is a method predominately used by those with limited cognitive resources; whether 
due to low WMC, ego depletion, distraction, or impulsivity.   
Our first analysis that focused on emotion regulation replicated their analysis by testing 
the total change in negative mood from the beginning to the end of the study.  The three-way 
interaction between WMC, affirmation condition, and bias in Figure 6 indicated that when in the 
morning routine condition, as WMC and bias rates increased, negative affect decreased.  This 
result supports the findings of Schmeichel and Demaree (2010) because it shows that people with 
high WMC were able to use self-enhancing behavior in order to effectively regulate their 
emotions.   
Although the following does not apply to the replication, it is important to note that after 
affirming important values, people with high WMC and high bias experienced an overall 
increase in negative mood.  Not only was biasing not useful to people with high WMC but, in 
this case, it was detrimental. This may be because those who biased despite having already 
affirmed their values have another personality variable (i.e., narcissism) that makes their self-
concept more fragile than usual.  While emotion regulation seems to have been less successful 
for the high WMC people who self-affirmed, at least the gap between low and high WMC people 
with high emotional reactivity closed to non-significance.  Clearly, both groups were just as 
successful at emotion regulation when using self-affirmation as their primary means of 
alleviating their emotional distress. 
One limitation of this successful replication is that this analysis discounts the change in 
mood that could have been caused by various other components of the study—or, in the case of 
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Schmeichel and Demaree, the change in mood that people are likely to experience from the day 
of the first session to the day of the second session.  To account for this possible source of error, 
we examined an additional measurement of affect immediately following the negative feedback 
(i.e., PANAS 2), and calculated the difference between it and the measurement immediately 
following their opportunity to self-enhance in the OCQ (i.e., PANAS 3).  With this additional 
PANAS measurement, we demonstrated that the significant effect from the replication analysis 
disappears, raising a question concerning the nature of the relationship between biasing and 
emotion regulation as presented in past research.  These results suggest that emotion regulation 
in this context is not an effortful process facilitated by self-enhancement, but instead is an 
automatic process that does not need to be facilitated by coping techniques in order to be 
successful.   
Clearly, people with high WMC use methods of implicit emotion regulation more 
successfully and with more frequency in the morning routine condition than those with low 
WMC.  But what implicit methods do they utilize? Nail, Misak and Davis (2004) suggested a 
plethora of psychological resources that someone can turn to when they have to deal with 
dissonance, including implicit self-esteem, self-serving attributions, positive affect, and 
automatic interpretive biases.  The only method that we can address with our data is positive 
affect, and although we can agree that although high WMC individuals do seem to exhibit more 
positive affect on average, this positive affect tells us little about their cognitive processes that 
facilitated it.   
Limitations 
The main concern that arose while conducting this study was the absence of a true control 
condition, as used within Schmeichel and Demaree’s study.  A true control condition would have 
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allowed us to see if we were observing self-enhancing behavior in response to the threatening 
situation or if we were simply observing personality traits.  For example, people low in WMC 
may not have been offended by the feedback—they may instead just always bias more, which is 
a personality trait that has been correlated with narcissism (Paulhus, 2003).   
A limitation that was within both this study and Schmeichel and Demarree’s study is the 
reliability of the simple accuracy and bias measurements.  The problem is that these two 
calculations do not appear to measure the constructs that they claim to.  Bias is supposed to 
measure a person’s over-claiming but the score groups together hits and the false alarms, 
assigning equal weight to them both.  This method does not differentiate between real knowledge 
and over-claiming.  In fact, someone with no hits and all false alarms would receive the same 
score as someone with all hits and no false alarms.  Although accuracy is supposed to measure 
the individual’s ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect responses, it disregards the 
theory that it was based on (i.e., if someone over-claims on false items, then they must also over-
claim on true items) and assumes that all of the hits are based on true knowledge.  In other 
words, simply because the participant claimed knowledge of a real item does not mean they have 
any knowledge of it.  In this case, claiming familiarity with this real item would be no better than 
making a false alarm, except no penalties are allocated—does this make them accurate or just 
lucky? Macmillan and Creelman (2005) suggest other methods of calculating this score, like 
criterion location (i.e., c) in place of bias and d prime in place of accuracy.  
One problem with measuring both affect and defensive behaviors is that the two things 
are often not independent. In fact, people who are more motivated to sustain their positive affect 
may be the most likely to use defensive behaviors (Ferrer et al., 2011).  If this were the case, we 
would have mislabeled defensive behaviors as successful emotion regulation.  These constructs 
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can be difficult to properly identify, thus why it is recommended to use additional means of 
measuring the same construct to verify one’s results, as well as to include other personality 
measurements (i.e., narcissism, self-esteem, etc.) as covariates. 
As with all small studies in the university setting, we did not have a true randomized 
sample.  Everyone within our sample was a traditional undergraduate student at the university.  
Furthermore, our sample was also small for a study of individual differences, especially 
compared to Schmeichel and Demaree’s study (n = 102).  As a result of our small size, we did 
not obtain a large amount of variability in our measurement of negative affect. This small 
variability means that our study has relatively little power and thus, because of these reasons, our 
trends cannot be applied to outside populations. 
Future Directions 
There are many more variables that have been demonstrated to correlate with self-
enhancement (like narcissism, explanatory style and self-esteem) that our study did not take into 
consideration.  In the future, it would be useful to investigate how these variables may moderate 
the effectiveness of affirmation and how they may contribute to creating more accurate models 
of self-enhancing behavior.   
One particularly important individual difference variable to include in the future is 
explanatory style.  Inclusion of this trait would account for differences in coping strategies—
optimistic individuals employ approach coping strategies to eliminate, reduce, or manage stress, 
whereas pessimistic individuals employ avoidance coping strategies to ignore, avoid, or 
withdraw from stress (Solberg Nes & Segerstrom, 2006).  By identifying these groups, future 
research will cease collapsing across styles of attribution and begin recognizing old error to be 
important individual difference characteristics. 
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To emphasize the importance of studying narcissism in the context of self-enhancing 
behavior, Paulhus et al. originally developed the Over-Claiming Questionnaire with the purpose 
of identifying those who over-claim, not in response to threat, but instead those who over-claim 
chronically (e.g., people with narcissistic personality traits).  Because affirmation did not 
decrease the overall bias levels, our results suggest that the participants within our study over-
claimed not as a result of the threat, but instead primarily because of their personality traits.  In 
future research, it would be important to have a true control group who receives no feedback so 
that we can assess the baseline level of over-claiming and therefore observe if the participants 
have successfully eliminated the threat through the process of self-affirmation.  Furthermore, 
since past research has shown that narcissists are less likely to view criticism as credible than 
they are to view compliments, identifying narcissistic personality traits could help us to predict if 
the person believed our negative feedback, which is always a struggle when conducting research 
with elements of deception (Shrauger, 1988; Taylor, 1991).   
The discrepancy between this study and Schmeichel and Demaree’s original study raises 
the question of if the type of feedback mattered.  In our study, we insulted one area and then 
gave them an opportunity to redeem themselves in the same area.  But within Schmeichel and 
Demaree’s, the threat was in an area that was no longer relevant.  Future studies should 
investigate if people deploy different emotion regulation techniques based upon the category of 
the threat, as well as the extent to which they identify with that area. 
Implications 
 Self-affirmation as an intervention is rapidly gaining ground in areas of research as 
diverse as prejudice (Fein & Spencer, 1997), medicine (Harris & Napper, 2005), and education 
(Miyake et al., 2010). As mentioned earlier, it imbues its users with an increased ability to 
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tolerate ambiguity, which is related to a variety of positive outcomes, such as decreased 
depression, effective emotion regulation, and general positive health (Feldman Barrett, Tugade & 
Engle).  Effective emotion regulation is a desirable skill because it has been linked to such 
important goals such as improved mental health, physical health, relationship satisfaction, and 
work performance (Koole, 2009).  In fact, chronic deficits in emotion regulation have been 
linked to all major forms of psychopathology.  For these reasons, the data here suggests that it 
would be a useful tool to include in various therapy programs, so as to help with the control and 
development of emotion regulation.  Further research should be conducted to investigate how the 
effects of self-affirmation can add up over time, in order to understand how to best implement 
this invention in therapy programs and/or workshops. 
Conclusion 
To a degree, self-enhancement can be used constructively as a form of emotion-
regulation, and psychologist Otto Rank argued in 1936, “To be able to live one needs illusions, 
not only outer illusions … but inner illusions [i.e., a secure sense of one’s active powers… ]”  (p.  
251-252).  Rank creates a picture of this type of mild self-enhancement as something necessary 
to avoid a fate of nihilism.  But in excess, self-enhancement can have negative consequences on 
relationships, work and emotional wellbeing.  Although our study did not discover a panacea for 
reducing self-enhancing behavior across all categories, we can successfully counteract the 
increase in defensive behaviors caused by threatening events with a simple ten-minute writing 
exercise.   
As humans, we have the ability to reflect upon the world around us, as well as the 
thoughts within our own minds.  By doing so, we are able to pass judgment on our thoughts and 
emotions prior to performing an action, allowing us to inhibit our initial response in favor of a 
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less drastic course of action.  When threatened, this thought process becomes cluttered with 
emotions, disabling one from exerting the same sort of self-control.  Self-affirmation counters 
these effects by reminding us of that which makes us human—our values and the ability to 
forego pleasure in the present in favor of greater returns in the future.  With our values in mind, 
emotion regulation becomes easier and defensive self-enhancing behavior becomes less 
appealing.   
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